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ARTICLE
Assessing the impact of ETS trading profit on
emission abatements based on firm-level
transactions
Jianfeng Guo 1,2, Fu Gu 3,4✉, Yinpeng Liu 1,2✉, Xi Liang5✉, Jianlei Mo1,2 & Ying Fan6
The EU Emission Trading System (ETS) is the oldest and currently the largest carbon market
in the world, but its purpose of stimulating carbon emissions via trading profits remains
unexamined. Based on the complete firm-level transaction records of the EU ETS Phases I and
II, here we show that the participating firms’ trading profits and their emission abatements
are positively correlated, and the correlation becomes stronger in Phase II than Phase I.
Specifically, we observe that non-linearity exists in the correlation; higher firm-level emission
abatements can realize larger trading profits. This pattern affects the market fairness, though
it may be helpful to incentivise emission abatements. The correlation is more regulated in
Phase II than it is in Phase I, thereby indicating that the Phase II is more mature. We also
observe that the state-level abatements are largely driven by industrial giants.
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Carbon emission trading has been proposed as a market-based policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions (mainly CO2) at the least possible cost. The
European Union (EU) launched the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on January 1, 2005 to fulfill the
commitment of 8% reduction in GHG emissions by 2012 com-
pared with 1990 proposed in the Kyoto Protocol1. Following the
EU ETS, a series of carbon markets have been established suc-
cessively, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the
United States and the Pilot Carbon Trading Markets in China2,3.
However, whether the incentives offered by such markets can be
realized in emission abatements needs to be examined, because
similar markets are continuously implemented worldwide2–5.
The EU ETS is a popular topic in the carbon market litera-
ture6–26 because it is the oldest and currently the largest carbon
market in the world. The EU ETS covers over 11,000 installations
from various industrial sectors across all EU member states and
even non-EU countries such as Norway, Iceland, and
Liechtenstein2,3. It is a cap-and-trade system, where a finite
quantity of emission permits, namely the Eurpean Union
Allowances (EUAs), is granted to the participating firms. There
also exist two other tradable permits, i.e., the Emission Reduction
Units (ERUs) and the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
Firms report their annual carbon emissions to the authorities and
surrender equivalent permits, each of which entitles its holder to
emit 1 tonne of CO2. The surpluses or shortages of the permits
are related to the quantity of one’s abatements for trading,
thereby influencing the firms’ tradings.
Previous studies investigated various aspects related to the
operation of the EU ETS, including market efficiency7–9, allow-
ance allocation9–11, pricing mechanism12–20, trade frictions21,
and market stability reserve22. Moreover, the EU ETS has an
influence on stock markets23–26, energy markets27–31, and
energy-intensive industries such as power32, metallurgical33, and
transport industries34,35. However, little effort has been exerted
on the incentiving effect of allowance trading on abatements; the
market incentives are supposed to motivate the emitters to
spontaneously and continuously reduce their GHG emissions. To
date, this issue has never been quantitatively investigated, even
though the EU ETS has been operating for over a decade.
The realization of the market incentives of the EU ETS is
supposed to be guaranteed by two major safeguards. First, the
abatements for trading are positively correlated to trading profits;
higher profits ought to be acquired from more carbon abate-
ments, while higher expenses shall be paid due to insufficient
abatements. Since emission reduction is a long-term
compaign3,36,37, firms should achieve abatements continuously,
and the cap-and-trade market would provide incentives to sup-
port such efforts. Second, market regulation aims at constraining
potential manipulation of dominant participants, thereby ensur-
ing market fairness. Although cumulative market incentives can
stimulate firms to abate their emissions continuously, it has
potentials to endow big players with the market power, which
could jeopardize the market fairness. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the effectiveness of these safeguards remains
unexamined.
Focusing on the subjects of the Phase I and II, this study
examines the effectiveness of the market incentives that aims at
stimulating abatements for trading. In detail, we reviewed the
correlation between first the profits of firms (i.e., emitters)
acquired from trading physical carbon allowances (defined as
trading profits and denoted as profits r), and second the emission
abatements for trading (the gaps between the allocated (and
obtained from auctions, i.e., baseline emissions) and the surren-
dered allowances (i.e., actual emission), denoted as gap g), in a
complete phase. Different types of abatements are illustrated in
the Supplementary Discussion: Decomposition of emission
abatements.
We aggregate the cash flows of all physical transactions of
EUAs, CERs, and ERUs at their corresponding daily prices. The
resulting values of the cash flows are considered as the trading
profits (i.e., profits from allowance trading). Although the use of
the daily values may cause deviations in the daily cash flows of
individual firms, such deviations would not affect the cash flow
distribution of all firms in a complete phase. The same principle is
applicable for the daily-based stock market analysis. Therefore,
the use of daily carbon prices does not affect the outcomes of this
research, though using high-frequency prices could improve the
accuracy of cash flow calculation. The data of the allocated and
surrendered allowances are obtained from the compliance
records. The impact of the firms’ characteristics and other
external factors, such as macroeconomics, are excluded, since
such factors are irrelevant to our objective of examining the
impact of incentives on abatements.
The contribution of this study is fourfold. First, based on the
complete firm-level trading records of Phase I and II in the EU
ETS, we observe that emission abatements and trading profits are
generally positively correlated. The effectiveness of the market
incentives has been empirically verified, as abatements can be
realized into profits. Second, using a quantile regression, we find
the presence of non-linearity in the positive correlation between
trading profits and emission abatements. Higher abatements have
been realized greater profits; the Matthew effect (i.e., the rates of
return of participants are positively correlated to their profit
levels) exists in the EU ETS. Despite the pattern being helpful in
stimulating carbon abatements, it grants big players with
manipulative market power, thereby damaging the market fair-
ness. Third, our findings suggest that the EU ETS is more mature
in Phase II than in Phase I, as the incentives were given to par-
ticipants in a fairer manner; the positive coefficient between r and
g becomes smaller in Phase II than that in Phase I. Moreover, in
Phase II, the extreme trading patterns are controlled and the
Matthew effect is weakened. Lastly, we find that industrial giants
play a decisive role in determining the state-level correlation
between trading profits and emission abatements. Since big firms
have higher rates of return in the allowance trading, their
abatements and tradings require specific attention.
Results
Correlating profits and abatements. Figure 1 presents the
complete quantile distribution. It shows that the density function
shifts as the conditional quantile increases, which is evidence that
the relation between r and g is non-linear. The presence of
location shift proves that the relationship can be modeled by the
quantile regression.
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the estimated r
of firms with different g quantiles. There are four observations on
firm-quantiles relationship. First, the mean values of r increases as
the values of g increases, thereby indicating that higher gaps
correspond to higher profits. In other words, GHG abatements
are financially rewarded in the cap-and-trade system. Second, as g
increases, the standard deviation increases together with a
decrease of the Kurtosis value. These results can be explained
by a wide positive gap, which exerts low pressure on the firms to
surrender allowances, thereby providing firms with diversified
options to trade their extra allowances. Consequently, the range
of the trading profits of firms tend to be wider than those of firms
with narrow gaps. Third, the skewness values are positive in all
the quantiles, thereby indicating that only a few firms can profit
more highly than their sample average. This phenomenon is
considerably significant in Phase I. Fourth, the Kurtosis value
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decreases with increasing gap level, thereby indicating that firms
with wide gaps apparently obtain their profits unevenly.
This quantile regression results (Fig. 2) unveils three major
findings about the effect of market incentives on emission
abatements in the EU ETS. First, the coefficients of β(τ) are above
zero in all quantiles, as well as in both phases, thereby indicating
that abatements for trading can be well-realized as trading profits;
it is common in other forms of market. Second, the estimated
coefficients of β(τ) are greater in the higher quantiles than those
in the lower ones; the presence of the Matthew effect is observed
in the EU ETS. This observation shows that higher marginal
profits go hand in hand with higher abatements, the realization of
trading profits for emitters of different abatement levels is non-
linear. Third, the increment of β(τ) is approximately linear in
Phase I, but it becomes an S-shaped trend in Phase II. In addition,
the range of β(τ) is much wider in Phase I than in Phase II.
This difference implies that the Matthew effect is stronger in
Phase I, while such effect is weakened in Phase II. Although
promoting more abatements tends to be generally preferable,
such unlimited markets incentives are not fair; advantageous
emitters tend to gain the manipulative market power, thereby
heavily influencing the allowance transactions. Under this
consideration, the abatement motivations of the other emitters
could be weakened, as they cannot acquire sufficient mariginal
profits from allowance trading. On the contrary, the market
becomes more mature and fair, provided that the effect of market
incentives is moderate.
In the processed g–r coordinate system, the distribution of the
firms’ coordiantes in Phase I is more dispersive, whereas firms’
coordinates in Phase II are clustered. The patterns of firms’
trading performance in the heat maps are generally compatible
with the quantile regression results because the majority of the
participating firms are concentrated in small linear zones around
the origin of the g–r coordinate system. For Phases I and II, the
distributions of the grids with more firms are similar to the
overall distributions of all the participating firms. This finding
indicates that the distributions of firms’ trading performance in
the g–r coordinate system have multiscale fractal characteristics,
thereby proving that the g–r coordinate system is robust. The
linearity of Phase II is more evident than that of Phase I because
the distribution of firms in the heat map of Phase II (Fig. 3b) is
considerably linear and symmetric. Figure 3 provides further
evidence to support the claim that EU ETS gradually reaches
maturity in Phase II, as non-linearity in the realization of
emission abatements is reduced. It implies that the extreme r–g
patterns are more regulated in Phase II. Based on the firm-level
empirical analysis, we confirm that the incentiving effect is valid
and the market has matured.
a b
Fig. 1 Comparison of the profit distributions in different quantiles based on the firm-level trading data. Five distributions (line Level 1 to Level 5) are
presented with trading profits of the 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 0.70, and 0.90 quantiles. The densities of the distributions are calculated by the estimated
conditional quantile. a, b The profit distributions of Phase I and II of the EU ETS, respectively.
Table 1 Definitions and statistics of the quantiles.
Level τ Phase I Phase II
r M SD K S r M SD K S
1 0.1 −10,306.5 1.7E+ 05 2.2E+ 06 134.5 9.8 −12,889 7.9E+ 04 4.1E+ 06 89.7 1.3
2 0.3 −316.0 2.3E+ 05 2.2E+ 06 133.3 9.8 4,170.6 1.2E+ 05 4.1E+ 06 89.3 1.3
3 0.5 11,952.5 3.0E+ 05 2.2E+ 06 131.7 9.7 18,694.0 2.8E+ 05 4.1E+ 06 89.1 1.2
4 0.7 40,120.7 4.7E+ 05 2.3E+ 06 127.5 9.5 51,096.4 6.5E+ 05 4.1E+ 06 88.5 1.1
5 0.9 186,752.6 1.3E+ 06 2.4E+ 06 100.4 8.0 247,575.2 2.9E+ 06 4.2E+ 06 84.4 0.5
Level 1 firm is at the 0.1 quantile of the distribution of g. Levels 2–5 are defined in a similar manner. The M, SD, K, and S denote the mean, standard deviation, kurtosis, and skewness, respectively, of the
estimated r of firms with different g quantiles.
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Trading profits at state-level. To further examine the incenti-
vizing effect of the cap-and-trade system, we investigate the effect
of market incentives on carbon abatements in the allowance
trading of each EU ETS member state. Figure 4 summarizes this
correlation of all participating states.
Figure 4 shows that the majority of the participating states are
well-ordered, whereas several abnormal states (i.e., states that are
not in the clustered part of the linear sector) are highlighted. In
Phase I, the UK had positive trading profit with a negative
allowance gap. Germany made the highest profit, but its
abatement was nearly zero. France gained an increased positive
trading profit from its positive abatement. Poland profited slightly
from the market, although it had the highest abatement. Spain
had the lowest trading profit and allowance gap. In Phase II,
Germany held both the lowest trading profit and emission
abatement. France had the second-highest abatement but
recorded a trading loss from the EU ETS. Poland obtained high
trading profit at low emission abatement. Romania gained the
a b
Fig. 2 The estimated results of the linear quantile regression model based on the of the firm-level trading data. In the plots of Phases I (a) and II (b), the
estimated slopes of quantile 0.1 to 0.9 are plotted as a function of β(τ), the estimated intercepts of the results are not reported for simplicity and specificity
reasons. The area enclosed by gray dotted lines represents a 95% confidence interval of estimated β(τ). The red line indicates the overall linear coefficient
and its 95% confidence interval is enclosed by red dotted lines.
ba
Fig. 3 Heat maps of firms’ trading performance based on the firm-level trading data. a, b The firms’ trading performance in Phase I and Phase II,
respectively. The firms are plotted on the g–r coordinate system using their processed abatements for trading g’ and trading profits r’ as coordinates. The
different colors of the grids denote different volumes of the participating firms within the corresponding grids.
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highest trading profit and the largest emission abatement.
However, the state-level trading profits and emission abatements
of the majority of the states have positive linear correlation.
Therefore, we can classify these abnormal states into two
categories: first states with deviated performance (i.e., the UK,
Germany, and Poland in Phase I; and Germany, France, and
Poland in Phase II); and second states with extreme trading
patterns (i.e., France and Spain in Phase I, and Romania in Phase
II). Figure 5 depicts the firm-level g–r correlations of these
abnormal states.
Figure 5 reveals that the g–r correlations of the majority of the
firms in these states in both phases are linear and positive. On the
contrary, the state-level g–r correlation is disturbed by some firms
with increased trading profits or wide gaps. In other words, the
national trading patterns of the participating states in EU ETS are
mainly determined by several domestic industrial giants because
their r and g values are much higher than those of others. The
quantile regression results (Fig. 2) can be attributed to the trading
patterns of the participating firms because the majority of these
firms behave in a similar manner. By contrast, only a few big
firms contribute to most of the observed deviations.
These abnormal giants have three distinctive patterns. First, the
distribution of the g–r correlations of these firms is relatively
dispersive, thereby disturbing the state-level trading patterns.
Typical examples include the UK in Phase I, Germany in Phase II,
and France and Poland in both phases. This observation implies
that firms did not accurately predict their emission levels or
allowance values. Second, firms with high trading volumes
amended the trading pattern of the state, even if the g–r
correlations of most firms in the same state are abnormal.
Germany in Phase I fits this scenario. We posit that firms with
advanced low-carbon technologies have low expectations of
allocated allowances. Moreover, only a few distinguishable firms
have the chance of profiting from carbon allowance trading.
Third, although the g–r coordinate of firms within the same state
are generally linear, some participating firms evidently deviate
from the general cluster. One typical example is Romania in
Phase II.
In summary, the number of abnormal firms is limited and their
distribution appears to be random and symmetric in EU ETS.
This result implies that the cap-and-trade system is generally
effective in reducing GHG emissions. The g–r cooridantes of the
majority of the participating firms concentrate in the linear
sector, thereby proving the high effectiveness of the incentivizing
effect of the cap-and-trade carbon market. The trading profits of a
single firm are determined by the gap of carbon allowances but
are also under the influences of the decisions or characteristics of
firms, such as market expectations and trading strategies. Our
analysis suggests that firms’ trading profits are positively
correlated with emission abatements for trading but will deviate
owing to the presence of other influencing factors.
Discussion
Our analysis provides three important findings based on the
unique complete firm-level transaction data set. First, the incen-
tivizing effect of carbon allowance trading of the EU ETS is
realized; we observe that the total trading profits of firms are
positively correlated with their carbon abatements for trading.
This finding reveals that as a market-based instrument to reduce
carbon emissions, the cap-and-trade system is generally effective,
even though large allowances were simply traded for compliance
obligation3,12.
Second, we find that non-linearity exists in the correlations
between trading profits r and emission abatements for trading g.
This observation indicates that the firms of higher emission
abatements can acquire greater profitability for carbon allowance
trading; the presence of the Matthew effect in the allowance
trading in the EU ETS is detected. Some participants have higher
rates of return in both directions, thereby affecting the fairness of
realizing the financial awards of emission abatements in the cap-
and-trade market. This can be attributed to the inactive trading
environment where the participants with bigger trading scale
intentionally or unintentionally manipulate the market to some
extent38. Yet, this pattern seems to be weakened in Phase II over
Phase I, confirming that the EU ETS becomes more mature in the
latter phase. This finding agrees with the extant macroeconomic
literature that suggests the increasing maturity of EU ETS7,8.
Stable value realization of emission abatements facilitates the
financial management of carbon allowances, which are widely
recognized as financial assets39–44 that influence a series of energy
commodities such as crude oil and natural gas29.
Our final observation was obtained in the comparison of the
state-level r–g correlations of the participating states in the carbon
market. The majority of the states and firms have similar trading
ba
Fig. 4 State-level trading performance based on the aggregation of the firm-level trading data. The participating states are plotted on the g–r coordinate
system, where the combined g and r of all firms that belong to one state are employed as the coordinates of the state. States with abnormal trading pattern
(i.e., states with g–r coordinates that are not in the generic cluster) include the UK, Germany, France, Poland, and Spain in Phase I (a); and Germany,
France, Poland, and Romania in Phase II (b). Generic cluster refers to the linear sector where the coordinates of the majority of the states concentrate.
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patterns because they profited proportionally to their abatements
for trading. Meanwhile, certain companies with significant
allowance gaps affected their countries significantly. For example,
in Phase I, the UK had positive trading profit with a negative g,
while Germany made the highest profit with a zero abatement for
trading. The extant literature has reviewed the impact of EU ETS
on the industrial sectors32–35. To the best of our knowledge,
insufficient attention has been directed at the realization of
national carbon abatements through firm-level trading in the
scheme possibly owing to limited data availability. Accordingly,
our unique firm-level trading data set fills in this knowledge gap.






Fig. 5 State-level trading performance of the abnormal states. By grouping the firm-level trading data into states, there are five states, namely United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, and Romania, abnormally performed in the EU ETS. The Phase I performance of these states is plotted on the left side
of the figure (a, c, e, g, and I, respectively). The Phase II performance is plotted on the right side (b, d, f, h, and j, respectively).
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administrators is that increased attention should be provided to
monitor the transactions of these industrial giants. But this
finding may be inappropriate to regulate firms’ trading behaviors
in such a market. The abnormal firms may have at least one of the
following features: conducting a few transactions and odd trading
behaviors, e.g., conducting transactions only in certain periods.
These transactions cause these firms to be overrewarded or
overpunished. Hence, active and balanced transactions with
directions (i.e., buy or sell) and timepoints selected based on
market expectationn’ s can guarantee that firms are properly
rewarded according to their gaps, thereby possibly improving the
carbon abatement mechanism of the EU ETS. Among all the
potential national differences that affect trading, the development
of low-carbon technologies varies from one member state to
another is worthy of in-depth investigation because of its influ-
ence on the majority of the participating firms at the state level.
Methods
Data aggregation. Our analysis is based on a unique firm-level data set that
combines all transaction records in the Community Independent Transaction Log
(CITL) of Phase I and the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) of Phase II or
the Kyoto Phase. The detailed aggregation procedure of this unique data set is
presented in the Supplementary Method: Construction of firm-level trading data
set. This unique data set can be regarded as the complete transaction log of Phases I
and II allowances (. Allowance transaction data have been maximized in the
microeconomic literature to identify the determinants of an emitter’s trading
volume45, trading threshold46, trading activities47, effects of transaction costs48,
and performance49. To the best of our knowledge, no research has constructed
firm-level trading data in such comparable detail and so completely. Moreover, the
data employed in the extant literature either only cover Phase I45,47,48 or fails to
link installations to firms45,49. Using the unique microlevel trading data set, we aim
to examine the effect of the market incentives that are provided by the cap-and-
trade system on carbon abatements.
Model construction. To avoid the inequality of the data and find some potential
non-linear relationships, we employ a quantile regression model to investigate the
correlation between firm profits(r) and quantiles(g) in EU ETS:
QτðrjgÞ ¼ αðτÞ þ βðτÞ ´ g; ð1Þ
where α(τ) is the intercept and ß(τ) is the quantile coefficient that depends on τ.
The model is derived by specifying the τth conditional quantile as Qτ (r | g) and





ρτ ´ ri  αðτÞ  βðτÞ ´ gi½ ; ð2Þ
where ρτ(z) is a linear loss function defined as z(τ−1) if z < 0; otherwise, zτ.
We use 20 quantiles (i.e., 0.05, 0.10, 0.15,…, 0.95) in the analysis. All regression
results for these quantiles are significant for the carbon trading data of Phases I and
II can be found in Fig. 2a, 2b. The quantile regression results are based on the firm-
level dataset. In addition, we employ heat maps to visualize the distributions of r
and g in detail. The differences in the goodness-of-fit values of the different phases
can be effectively explained visually via the heat maps (Fig. 3), in which r and g are
processed as follows:
g0 ¼ sigðgÞ ffiffigp ; ð3Þ
r0 ¼ sigðrÞ ffiffirp ; ð4Þ
sigðxÞ ¼
1; x>0






where sig(x) is a signal function.
The process and outcomes of robustness check is given in the Supplementary
Method: Robustness check.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The data sets generated during or analyzed in this study are available from the
corresponding author upon any reasonable requests. The raw data that our firm-level
trading data were derived from are available in the public domain: EUTL dataset (https://
ec.europa.eu/clima/ets/). The firm-level data and the sub data in major countries are
available on Figshare (https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12034482.v1; https://doi.org/
10.6084/m9.figshare.12034503.v1; https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12034479.v2).
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